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Abstract
Research into cascading failures in power-transmission
networks requires detailed data on the capacity of individ-
ual transmission lines. However, these data are often un-
available to researchers. As a result, line limits are often
modelled by assuming they are proportional to some av-
erage load. Little research exists, however, to support this
assumption as being realistic. In this paper, we analyse the
proportional-loading (PL) approach and compare it to two
linear models that use voltage and initial power flow as
variables. In conducting this modelling, we test the ability
of artificial line limits to model true line limits, the dam-
age done during an attack and the order in which edges
are lost. we also test how accurately these methods rank
the relative performance of different attack strategies. We
find that the linear models are the top-performing method
or close to the top in all tests. In comparison, the toler-
ance value that produces the best PL limits changes de-
pending on the test. The PL approach was a particularly
poor fit when the line tolerance was less than two, which is
the most commonly used value range in cascading-failure
research. We also find indications that the accuracy of
modelling line limits does not indicate how well a model
will represent grid collapse. In addition, we find evidence
that the network’s topology can be used to estimate the
system’s true mean loading. The findings of this paper
provide an understanding of the weaknesses of the PL ap-
proach and offer an alternative method of line-limit mod-
elling.
∗ucabbou@ucl.ac.uk
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1 Introduction
The networked structure of power-transmission grids
makes them susceptible to cascading failures. A cascad-
ing failure occurs when a single failure or a small number
of failures propagate through a system, wreaking havoc.
While major blackouts caused by cascading failures are
rare, they affect very large numbers of people and have
significant financial consequences. A major blackout in
2003 in the US Northeast is estimated to have cost around
USD6 billion [30]. In 2012 a cascading failure in the In-
dian power grid caused a loss of power to 600 million
people [15]. More recently in 2019 [2], a failure in the
interconnector between Argentina and Uruguay caused a
blackout that affected nearly the entirety of both coun-
tries, close to 50 million people. Such massive failures
occur through the cascading effect, and their distribution
follows a power law [12, 9, 17]. This means there are a
large number of blackouts of little consequence and a very
small number that are of the scale described in the exam-
ples given previously. This paper explores a commonly
used method to simulate cascading failures in the power
grid, known as proportional loading, and finds that inac-
curate estimation of the system tolerance produces results
that do not represent the true behaviour of the grid.
Given the potential magnitude of cascading failures, it
is unsurprising that researchers are looking for ways to
reduce their impact and frequency. One method of under-
standing cascading failures is through network science.
The cascading failures are stimulated using targeted at-
tacks on network nodes or edges. Substantial work in
this regard has focused on developing ‘vulnerability met-
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rics’ or ‘attack strategies’ that identify the order in which
nodes should be attacked to cause maximum damage to
the power grid.
When researchers first started analysing power grids
using network science, the techniques applied used purely
topological information about the power-grid structure
[11]. As research developed, the power-grid’s electri-
cal properties were incorporated into the analysis, cre-
ating the ‘Extended topology’ [4]. Specifically, the ex-
tended topology integrates the power flowing in the net-
work with the topological features. Electricity is trans-
mitted through the power grid using alternating current
(AC) to reduce power loss over long distances. However,
as the AC power-flow equations are challenging to solve,
researchers often use direct-current (DC) flow equations
as an approximation. A recent literature review showed
that 81% of studies that involved power flow used the DC
approximations [11]. we use the DC flow calculations
f = CA(ATCA)−1p described by [26] and [3]. In this
equation, A is the adjacency matrix with the slack bus
removed to make the system invertible, C is a diagonal
matrix of the line susceptance and p is the power injected
at each line.
Many studies create synthetic networks [26, 3, 32, 18]
or use the topological structure of a real power grid with-
out the line limits [33, 32, 8, 20, 29]. Knowing these
limits is necessary to detect when a line has tripped in a
simulation. Although some open-data solutions are be-
ing developed [22], the lack of datasets with line limits
remains a problem. Little modelling or simulation work
has been done using real line limits [19] for this reason.
If these limits are not available in the data, an estimate
needs to be made. A common technique for this is to use
proportional loading (PL). When using the PL approach,
the line limits are set at a fixed proportion of the amount
of power flowing in each line at initiation [23, 20, 26, 33,
35, 21, 24]. The PL of networks is usually defined as
fmaxi = α | f ci |, where | f ci | is the absolute power flow for
line i under initial conditions, fmaxi is the line limit and α
is the tolerance factor. The PL approach makes strong as-
sumptions about power-grid design for which there is no
supporting evidence.
As there is no direct comparison between PL and real
line limits, it is difficult to know how accurately PL and
the simulations based on it reflect real-grid behaviour or
whether a more realistic method can be created. In this
paper, we address this gap. We have access to a dataset of
the UK high-voltage power grid that includes the genera-
tion and load nodes with capacities in MW, as well as the
line limits in MW.
We compare the real line limits of the network against
the PL values of α between 1 and 50, the results produced
by two linear models and a topological analysis. We sim-
ulate random attacks on the power grid and analyse how
well the artificial line limits model the damage caused by
the attack, as well as the order in which the edges are lost
due to cascading. We also measure how well each line-
limit method ranks the relative effectiveness of different
grid-attack strategies. The findings of this paper provide
an understanding of the PL approach’s weaknesses and
provide an alternative method of line-limit modelling.
2 Method
The analysis was conducted in four stages to test different
aspects of how well the artificial line limits model the real
line limits. The code used to generate the results in this
paper is available on GitHub [5, 6].
1. We look at the network’s real line-limit distribution.
We then compare the accuracy of PL and the mod-
elled limits against the real line limits.
2. We simulate random attacks on the grid using the
DC-flow approximations. We attack the grid until
it collapses completely, repeating the process 100
times. We compare the mean damage and standard
deviation of the artificial line limits and the real line
limits at each stage of the attacks.
3. We compare the rank order in which edges are lost
due to cascades between the artificial and real line
limits. We then calculate the correlation coefficient,
which shows us which artificial line-limit method
most accurately represents the behaviour of grid col-
lapse.
4. To test whether the artificial line limits can compare
vulnerability metrics, we attack the grid using five
different strategies. We measure the ability of the
artificial line limits to accurately represent the true
ranking of each strategy using the real line limits.
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Table 1: PEARL settings used in this paper.
Class Types
Physics Cascading DC, Topological
Element Node
Attack Type Fixed
Removal Sequential
Load Profile Single
The dataset we use in this paper describes the phys-
ical and electrical structure of the UK national grid.
The dataset contains 512 nodes representing substations
around the UK. The nodes are connected with 698 trans-
mission lines that are rated 132kV, 275kV and 400kV. The
network has a mean degree of 2.73, and the average un-
weighted nodal distance is 11.7. The assortativity, clus-
tering and mean normalised centrality are close to zero
(-0.06 0.1 and 0.03, respectively). The dataset includes
all the information required to perform the DC load-flow
calculations. This information includes line-node connec-
tions, line-reactance node load and node generation. Un-
usually for a power-grid dataset, it also provides line lim-
its, making it possible to test the PL approach.
This paper defines the simulation using five parameters:
physics model, element, attack type, removal method and
load profile. The physics model used in this analysis is
DC flow or topological. That is the power model uses the
DC power flow assumptions, or is simply a topological
analysis. The elements attacked are the nodes. The at-
tack type is ‘fixed’, meaning that the order in which the
nodes will be removed is generated before the attack be-
gins. The order in which nodes are removed is sequential.
This means that only a single node is targeted for removal
each round. However, other nodes may be lost due to a
cascading failure. A summary of the parameters is shown
in Table 1 The last parameter is load profile. In this anal-
ysis, we use a single load profile based on the year-round
baseload provided as part of the dataset. These simula-
tion parameters form the acronym PEARL. (The PEARL
framework is discussed in greater depth in Appendix A).
2.1 Artificial line limits and real line limits
To understand how artificial line limits differ from real
line limits, we use 13 α values for PL, the topological ap-
proach and the line limits generated from two linear mod-
els. we use α values of 1.05, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 2, 3, 5, 7,
10, 15, 20 and 50. The α values were chosen based on
values used in other papers, typically 1 to 5, and extended
until 50. The topological analysis is identical to an α level
of infinity.
Line limits are caused by three main factors: thermal-
limits in the cable, voltage drop and frequency stability.
These three factors are all related to the line length and
its voltage [13]. To keep the models similar to PL, we
create a model that uses only the initial power flow on
the line and a second model that uses initial power flow
and the voltage as voltage data are available in several
open datasets [14, 27, 10]. The Voltage Power Flow (Volt
PF) model has the form yi = β01+β f xi f +βv275xiv275 +
βv400xiv400, where yi is the line limit of the ith power line,
xi f is the initial power flow of the ith power line in MW
and xiv275, xiv400 are binary vectors representing the volt-
age level of line i. The coefficients are β f , βv275, βv400,
respectively, while β0 is the model bias. The power-flow-
only model (PF model) has the form yi = β01+β f xi f . The
models are trained using tenfold cross-validation. These
models will be compared to the PL approach throughout
the paper. Ideally, we could use the models to predict the
line limits of a separate network. However, we only have
access to the real line limits of a single network. As this
is the case, we will use the line limits predicted in each
of the validation sets as the predicted line limits for the
attack simulation. The artificial line limits are compared
to the real line limits using R2, Root Mean Square Error
(RMSE) and Mean Average Percent Error (MAPE).
2.2 Comparing attack damage between the
PL approach and real line limits
we simulate the grid under attack by assigning a random-
node attack rank to each network node. We then remove
the node with Rank 1. As node removal can cause over-
loading, we recalculate the power flow and remove any
lines that exceed their maximum line limit. We then re-
balance the power and load in the network. Line removal
can cause the network to break into subcomponents, so we
remove any nodes that are in a subcomponent that has no
power. We then recalculate power flow. This process con-
tinues until no further removals occur. We then find the
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Figure 1: Schematic of the node removal process
node with the next lowest attack rank and remove it, re-
peating the process until no nodes remain in the network.
The process is described in Algorithm 1 for the graph G,
the set of n nodes/vertices V and the set of m edges E. A
schematic of the process is shown in Figure 1.
Algorithm 1 Attack the grid
1: procedure ATTACKTHEGRID(G)
2: V ←V (G)
3: E← E(G)
4: while V 6= /0 do
5: remove mini(vi) . i is the order in which
nodes will be attacked
6: repeat
7: calculate power flow in G
8: for e ∈ E do
9: remove e if fe > fmaxe . Power flow
exceeds line limit
10: end for
11: rebalance generation and supply
12: for v ∈ V do
13: remove v if subgraph has no power
14: end for
15: until fe < fmaxe for all e
16: end while
17: end procedure
During the attack simulation, two different damage
metrics will be used to analyse attack progression. These
are giant-component size, measured as the largest con-
nected component, and blackout size, measured as total
MW lost. These metrics will be compared to the graph’s
original state using ∆Px = 1− P1−PxP1 , where P1 is the com-
plete graph and Px is the graph after attack x. This way
of measuring damage returns a percentage between 0 (no
damage) and 100 (complete grid collapse).
We note here that using the largest connected compo-
nent as a measure might not be representative of the phys-
ical processes that occur on the power grid. For exam-
ple, say we have a network that has 100 nodes but only
two generators, where the first generator produces 99%
of the electricity and the other generates the remaining
1%. If the big generator fails, the giant-component size is
still 99%, indicating that the network is almost unaffected
even though there only is 1% of the necessary power. De-
spite this drawback, the metric’s simplicity has made it a
popular choice [1, 23, 28, 25], and so it will be included
here. Blackout size is a metric from the extended topol-
ogy. It measures the loss of system power in MW. This
metric is popular and has several different names with
slightly different implementations that produce similar re-
sults. It has been called ‘loss of load’ [31], blackout size
[19], ‘load shed’ [9], ‘power supply’ [24] and ‘total loss
of power’ [7] among other names. This metric does not
suffer the problem described above regarding the size of
the giant component.
2.3 Comparing the order in which edges are
lost due to cascade
Accurately modelling the damage done in an attack pro-
vides much insight into a grid’s vulnerability. Sometimes,
however, it is also useful to know the order in which nodes
or edges were lost as this information is used in some vul-
nerability metrics [34, 16, 35]. One caveat here, though,
is that if the order of the nodes being lost differs depend-
ing on the line limits, the results of such analyses will not
be reliable. To explore the robustness of loss order in re-
lation to line limits, we correlate the order in which nodes
are lost during an attack for artificial line limits with real
line limits.
Tables 2 and 3 give a toy example of how we compare
node-loss order. First, k node removal orders are gener-
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Table 2: The node removal orders are randomly generated
k times.
Node
ID Sim 1 Sim 2 · · · Sim k
A 1 4 · · · 3
B 2 2 · · · 8
C 3 1 · · · 7
D 4 6 · · · 6
E 5 5 · · · 1
F 6 7 · · · 2
G 7 8 · · · 5
H 8 3 · · · 4
ated. Then all k simulations are run using each line-limit
type. Table 3 shows Simulation 1 for the real line limits
and a line limit of α = 3. In the table, the yellow cells in-
dicate a node that has been targeted for removal, while the
other nodes were lost due to the cascade. We find the sim-
ilarity of network collapse by correlating the round lost to
the cascade of the nodes. This means we exclude nodes
that were targeted for removal. In the example, that means
only nodes F, G and H can be compared.
For each of the k simulations, we use the Spearman’s
correlation ρk =
cov(rgx,k,rgy,k)
σrgx,kσrgy,k
, where rgx,k and rgy,k are the
rank of xk and yk, respectively, for the n nodes in the net-
work. In this case, xk is the vector of the node-removal
rounds of the artificial line limit for Simulation k and
yk is the vector of the node-removal round for the real
line limits for Simulation k. In the example, this means
x1 = 2,4,4 and y1 = 1,3,2, giving a correlation of 0.866.
For the real experiment, we generate 100 attack orders
for the 512 nodes, producing 100 correlation scores per
line-limit method. We can then see how similar the arti-
ficial line limits’ collapse order is to that of the real line
limits.
2.4 Comparing vulnerability ranking accu-
racy
The choice of attack strategy can have a substantial impact
on results. Different strategies will damage the network
at different rates throughout the attack. When compar-
ing attack strategies, it may be that only the relative per-
Table 3: The numbers indicate the round in which the
node was lost in Simulation 1 for the real limits and α = 3.
Yellow nodes were targeted for removal and so are not
included when calculating removal similarity.
Node
ID
Real
Limits α = 3
A 1 1
B 2 1
C 1 2
D 3 3
E 4 1
F 2 1
G 4 3
H 4 2
formance is important. In this analysis, we compare the
ability of different line-limit methods to accurately rank
attack strategies. We compare five different attack strate-
gies across eight α values, the modelled limits and the
topological limits. The α values used in this analysis are
1.05, 1.1,1.5, 2, 5, 10, 20 and 50.
The attack strategies we use in this analysis are a mix-
ture of topological methods and extended topology. The
strategies are entropic degree [4] using line limit, entropic
degree [4] using initial power flow, degree, centrality and
electrical centrality [31].
Using each attack strategy to define the node-removal
order, we simulate an attack until we achieve complete
grid collapse. After each attack round (node removed),
we rank the strategies by total blackout size. The strategy
that caused the most damage to the network gets Rank 1
and the strategy that caused the least damage gets Rank 5.
We then compare the rankings obtained by each artificial
limit with the real line limits. Using RMSE, we evaluate
which line-limit method has the lowest error relative to
the real line limits.
3 Results
The results are split into two sections. The first section
describes the results of the linear model used to generate
line limits, and the second section compares the perfor-
mance of the different artificial line limits to the real line
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Figure 2: UK power-grid voltage level shown in geo-
graphical space and graph space. The 132-volt sections
of the network are much less densely connected than the
275 and 400-volt sections
limits
3.1 Modelling line limits
We first create a linear model that predicts line limits. The
variables used are voltage and initial power flow. The net-
work is represented in Figure 2 using a UK geographi-
cal location and a graph space representation using force
expansion. As we only have a single network, we use
tenfold cross-validation to train on 90% of the data and
then predict using the remaining 10%. The model coeffi-
cients are all quite stable with a proportionally small stan-
dard deviation.The coefficients were all positive across all
folds. The Volt PF model shows that as voltage increases
so does line limit. This is intuitive as high-voltage cables
are often used for bulk-power transmission (see Table 4).
Table 4: Mean model coefficients from 10-fold cross-
validation
Coefficients PF & Voltage Model PF Model
1 Intercept 2.30 2.71
2 PF (in 1000s) 2.46 7.57
3 Voltage 275 0.68
4 Voltage 400 1.00
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Figure 3: The distribution of the loading is left skewed
with a mean α of 5.12.
3.2 Comparing performance of different
line limits
An inspection of the power-grid tolerance distribution un-
der initial conditions shows that the system is not propor-
tionally loaded. Figure 3 shows the α distribution of the
power grid under initial loading. The power grid has a
mean α = 5.12 and a median α = 6.12 These tolerances
are much higher than those used in the literature, which
are typically less than two.
Correlating PL limits with real limits shows an R2 of
0.5. Using a range of α values, we find that the minimum
MAPE and RMSE are 0.52 and 1380 with α values of
3.6 and 3.5, respectively. The Volt PF model greatly out-
performs all PL models and the PF model (see Table 5).
The PF model has very poor performance across all three
metrics, which shows that it is not an effective method to
represent line limits accurately.
Table 5: Accuracy of modelling line-limits
Model Rsq RMSE MAPE
1 Volt Power-Flow 0.64 1037.14 0.43
2 Power-Flow 0.13 4446.96 1.07
We explore the damage done during random attack
across different values of alpha. We see that that alpha
has a logarithmic relationship with the damage for a given
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number of attacks. Figure 4 shows that for both damage
metrics the α levels only converge at grid collapse and do
not cross each other before that.
Figure 5 shows that, despite its poor ability to accu-
rately measure line limits, the PF model is the most ac-
curate method of measuring blackout size, with an RSME
of 0.077. The Volt PF model performs slightly worse than
the α = 5 (the system mean) in terms of blackout size.
These models have an RMSE of 0.085 and 0.082 respec-
tively.
For the giant component, the Volt PF model is the best
performer with an RMSE error of 0.087. The Volt PF
model is followed by α = 7, α = 10 which have RMSE
scores of 0.103 and 0.104 respectively. The PF model
comes fourth with an RMSE score 0.117.
The error relationship between blackout size and opti-
mum α is intuitive as it matches the average α of the real
line limits. The reason for the giant-component optimum
α is less apparent and may be linked to the topological
structure. The linear models perform well in both cases.
Next, we compare the standard deviation of damage
across all 100 simulations. The PF Volt model has the
best fit for the standard deviation of the blackout size,
with an RMSE of 0.023, followed by α = 10 (0.042). The
PF model is in ninth place with an RMSE of 0.209. The
accuracy of the PF Volt model comes from its ability to
represent the hump of the real limits shown in Figure 6,
something no value of α can replicate.
When looking at the RMSE of the standard deviation of
the damage of the giant component, we see that the Volt
PF model and α = 10, have similar score with 0.018 and
and 0.021 respectively. The PF model is in eighth place
with a score of 0.212.
We compare the correlation of the order of node loss
between each artificial line limit and the real line lim-
its. The correlation across all 100 simulations is shown
in Figure 7. The figure shows that, as α increases, the
node-loss-order similarity increases following a logarith-
mic growth curve with the topological analysis most sim-
ilar to the real line limits. The topological analysis has a
mean correlation of 0.853, more than three times as high
as α = 1.05, which has a mean of 0.277. The α = 50
model narrowly outperforms the Volt PF model, which
have correlation scores of 0.847 and 0.842 respectively.
The PF model has a significantly lower correlation score
of 0.730.
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Figure 4: Mean damage done in terms of giant compo-
nent and blackout size across 100 simulations, across all
13 α levels and the linear models. There is a log relation-
ship between α and damage done for a given number of
elements attacked.
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Figure 5: The PF model has the lowest RMSE with the
real limits. However, the Volt PF model and α = 5 are
close behind.
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Figure 7: The Volt PF model has the highest correlation.
Correlation of edge removal increases as α tends to infin-
ity, which is identical to the topological analysis.
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Figure 8: The figure shows the damage done to the power
grid by each attack strategy by percentage of the grid at-
tacked. As can be seen, strategy rank can change as a
higher percentage of nodes is removed.
Figure 8 shows plots of the damage caused by the five
attack strategies in four of the ten line-limit scenarios. As
can be seen, the rankings of the attack strategies change
as the number of nodes removed increases. We analyse
how well each line-limit method reflects the relative per-
formance of the attack strategies. We find that that the
PF Volt model (RMSE 0.818) is outperformed by α = 5
(0.776), while the PF model (1.02) came fifth, narrowly
beaten by α = 2 (0.971) and α = 10 (0.987) (see Figure
9). Values of α of 1.5 or less have a considerably greater
error in ranking different attack strategies.
That the low α values are much worse at ranking the
performance of attack strategies is important as the ma-
jority of PL papers use α values of less than five. One
reason for this may be that the cascade size is bigger with
lower α values.
An interesting question is whether the network grid
loading can provide any information about the system’s
true loading. Figure 10 shows a large drop in α when the
initial α of the system is much higher than the true sys-
tem mean α of five. In contrast, the load level ( 1α ) shows a
large drop when the initial α of the system is much lower
than the true system α . When the initial α is set to the
true system α , the sum of the change in α and load level,
∆Total = ∆α +∆ 1α , from initialisation is minimised (see
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Figure 11).
4 Discussion
This paper has found that using linear models to esti-
mate power-grid line limits gives consistently high per-
formance. The Volt PF model performs very well across
all tests whilst the PF performs better than most α values
but is not outstanding. We find that the optimum α level
is not consistent and changes depending on what is being
measured. Although the system mean α = 5 performed
well, sometimes other α values such as 10 or topological
provided the best performance in specific analyses. Re-
sults based on lower values of α may may imply that the
risk of cascading blackouts in some networks is greater
than it actually is and give a false indication of the robust-
ness of power networks to cascading failure.
An interesting finding was that the ability of the linear
model to measure line limits does not reflect the ability of
the linear model to accurately represent power-grid col-
lapse behaviour. Although the Volt PF model is much
more accurate at estimating line limits, the PF is more
accurate at modelling Blackout size during grid collapse.
This may be because the PF model makes large errors on
edges that do not overload and smaller errors on edges that
do. If a line is unlikely to overload, the limit is irrelevant.
A complicating factor is that the PF model has relatively
alpha Load level
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0%
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
0
10
20
30
40
50
Percent of elements attacked
M
ea
n 
gr
id
 le
ve
l
2
7
20
50
α level
Mean α value and mean Load level during attack
Figure 10: When the PL is a long way from the true sys-
tem mean, a large drop is observed in α or 1α as the attack
develops.
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poor correlation with the order in which the nodes are lost.
This result is probably related to the overloaded lines, of
which the PF model has more on average than the Volt PF
model or the real line limits. Further research is needed
to explore the relationship between modelling line limits
and modelling collapse damage, especially regarding the
importance of accurately identifying lines that may over-
load.
One of the major challenges of analysing power grids is
that reasonable loading levels are very difficult to identify.
In this paper, we found some evidence that, by analysing
the change in loading under attack, we can identify the
true value of the system α . If true, the link between
topology and α could be that the system has evolved as
a transport mechanism for load and generation that are
fixed geospatially and constrained in terms of MW range.
These findings are preliminary. To provide firmer evi-
dence, system attacks need to be simulated using a variety
of different mean α and load/demand profiles.
5 Conclusion
The title of this paper suggests that it is unwise to use arti-
ficial line limits when studying the collapse behaviour of
power grids under attack. In fact, given the importance of
artificial line limits in this field, we merely propose that
researchers consider carefully how they set these artifi-
cial line limits. This is because as we have shown, artifi-
cial line limits far from reality can produce results which
themselves are far from reality and do not represent real
grid behaviour. The goal of this paper has been to high-
light the difficulties posed by artificial line limits and in-
dicate some approaches which may lead to more accurate
line limit modelling, and as a result solutions to cascading
failures that are more applicable to real power networks.
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A Defining the simulation using the
PEARL framework
Understanding a simulation’s parameters is essential to
understanding how a simulation works. A lack of data
on the relative behaviour of different simulation meth-
ods makes it difficult to compare the results of different
studies. To better understand simulation output, simula-
tion parameters need to be clearly defined. Table 6 gives
a taxonomy of the simulation parameters used to define
the experiments in this study. The subsequent subsections
define each of the parameters and also the options imple-
mented in the R Power Grid Networking package [5]. The
simulation parameters proposed are not meant to be ex-
haustive but do describe key areas where clarity regarding
the simulation strategy will help with the interpretation of
the results and the replication of the experiments. N.B.:
The attack strategies are deployed within a simulation and
are not a part of the parameters.
Table 6: Classifications
Class Types
Physics Cascading DC, Topological
Element Node, Edge, Both
Attack Type Fixed, Flexible, Adaptive
Removal Regime Sequential, Simultaneous, hybrid
Load Profile No sampling, Random sampling,
Timeseries sampling, Random load
A.1 Physics
The physics model is usually the most well-defined part of
the simulation as it is the rule structure under which nodes
and edges will operate. The line-flow limits and balanc-
ing methods are included as part of the physics model.
Although there are many different physics models, in this
package we consider only two.
• Cascading DC: This model uses DC-flow calcula-
tions to decide whether line limits have been ex-
ceeded. This method can lead to cascading failures
as power is redistributed across the network.
• Topological: This is a purely topological view of the
power grid in which cascades are not possible. Al-
10
though there are no cascades, multiple nodes can be
lost in a single attack when a sub component is cre-
ated that does not have both load and generation.
This process can be reffered to as ‘Islanding’, as
the nodes are stranded on an island without power.
A topological analysis is equivalent to proportional
loading when α = ∞
A.2 Element
Are nodes, edges or both being targeted during this at-
tack? Certain attack strategies, such as degree, only work
on one element type, while others can be applied to both,
e.g., Net-ability [3].
• Nodes: Attack strategies only consider nodes.
• Edges: Attack strategies only consider edges.
• Both: Attack strategies consider nodes and edges.
Can only be used for certain metrics.
A.3 Attack type
The attack type defines how an attack strategy will be exe-
cuted. There are two classes of attack type: single calcula-
tion and repeated calculation. For single calculation, the
attack order is calculated once before the attack begins.
The repeated-calculation type only finds the next node to
be removed and is calculated again for every attack round.
The different attack types are defined below.
• Fixed: This single-calculation method produces a
target vector of n nodes for removal. If some of those
nodes are lost before being targeted, then the total
amount of nodes targeted for removal will be k− f ,
where f is the total number of nodes lost due to cas-
cades or islanding.
• Flexible: This single-calculation method produces
a target vector of k nodes for removal and then re-
moves n. This attack type is different from the fixed
method as it will always remove n nodes as long as
the graph still has nodes to remove. If n= 20 and the
19th node is lost in a cascade, the 21st node will be
added to the target list.
• Adaptive: This is a repeated calculation in which the
node order is recalculated at every attack. This attack
type allows the order of removal to change as an at-
tack develops. In a degree-based attack, after a few
node removal rounds some previously high-degree
nodes may have lost several neighbours. In contrast,
other loads may not have lost any neighbours and be
relatively more important.
A.4 Removal regime
The removal regime describes how nodes or edges will
be removed from the network. The regime has implica-
tions if the physics model allows cascades. However, the
removal regime has less of an effect in non-cascading sim-
ulations.
• Sequential: The nodes on the target list are removed
sequentially. The resulting cascades (if applicable)
are calculated, and the grid is stabilised before the
next node is removed.
• Simultaneous: The nodes in the target list are re-
moved at the same time. This only makes sense
when k n.
• Hybrid: The nodes are removed in small groups, but
the groups are removed sequentially. As an exam-
ple, 30 nodes will be removed; however, they will be
removed in three groups of 10.
A.5 Load profile
In many simulations, samples are taken to find a repre-
sentative final result. In such cases, how the samples are
chosen needs to be defined.
• No sampling: The most straightforward method.
Only a single attack run is made for each strategy
using a given load profile.
• Random sampling: Only useful for the random at-
tack strategy. The attack is repeated multiple times,
and the results averaged. In most other attack strate-
gies, the results will be identical.
• Time-series sampling: When a time series of loads
is available for a network, it is randomly sampled to
11
produce a variety of load profiles. Attacks can then
be performed across the multiple time points, and the
results analysed.
• Random-load sampling: Several papers have some
variant of randomly assigning loads and generation
across the network and then simulating attack. This
method can only be used when line limits are pro-
portional to initial loading.
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